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Kenneth A. Augustyn
Department of Physics 
Michigan Technological University, Houghton Michigan, 49931 USA 
kaaugust@mtu.edu 
Abstract
The Third Workshop on Biological Mentality was held from September 23, 
2019 to March 2, 2020 as a series of twenty-one Monday online conferencing 
sessions, each consisting of a talk followed by a Q&A discussion. Like the two 
previous workshops [1, 2], the objective of this workshop was to seek a deeper 
level of understanding the physical foundations of biological mentality (whether 
conscious or nonconscious). 
Keywords: Biological mentality, Mind-matter, Consciousness
1.  Introduction
Is our understanding of the brain unduly constrained by the computer 
metaphor? Is data processing sufficient to explain the mentality of living 
organisms? Is a living organism essentially the same as a robot with 
artificial intelligence, or is there something more?  Are quantum coherent 
processes present throughout the brain and if so how do they relate to 
mentality? 
Journal of Cognitive Science 21-3:371-384, 2020
©2020 Institute for Cognitive Science, Seoul National University
372   Kenneth A. Augustyn
These are some of the questions the workshop addressed in talks and 
discussions across the boundaries of many different disciplines with the 
goal of Improving our understanding of biological mentality.
This paper contains the Program for the workshop and brief statements 
by some of the speakers.  
Also in this Special Issue are papers from workshop participants Asim 
Islam, Alin Cucu, Stuart Kauffman, and Kenneth Augustyn.  The previous 
issue, J. Cog. Sci. 21:2,  contained a paper from participants John Myers and 
F. Hadi Madjid.
2. Program
Date Speaker Title
9/23/2019 Alin Cucu “Energy Conservation, Physicalism and the Prospects for Interactionist Dualism”
9/30/2019 Kenneth Augustyn “Life Transcended Computing before the Emergence of Consciousness”
10/7/2019 John Myers “Word Sequencing”
10/14/2019 J. Brian Pitts “Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind”
10/21/2019 Gustav Bernroider
“Bright and Dark Physics: A Dual Aspect 
Physicalistic Interpretation of Biological 
Mentality”
10/28/2019 Kenneth Augustyn “Why the Whole Idea of “Passing the Turing Test” is Damaging Western Civilization”
11/4/2019 J. Brian Pitts “General Relativity, Energy Conservation, and Mental Causation: Carroll’s Foundling”
11/11/2019 Brian Josephson “Towards a New Scientific Paradigm”
11/18/2019 Robert Prentner “Where is the Mentality in Biological Mentality?”
11/25/2019 Marcus Appleby “Quantum Mechanics and the Problem of Consciousness”
12/2/2019 Kenneth Augustyn “Why I like Penrose and Hameroff but don't like Orch OR”
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12/9/2019 Alin Cucu “Does QM Help Model Dualistic Mental Interaction?”
1/6/2020 Andrew F. Knight “Why Mind Uploading, Brain Copying, and Conscious Computers are Impossible”
1/13/2020 Art Hobson “The Entangled Measurement State is not a Paradoxical Superposition of the Detector”
1/20/2020 Robert Prentner “Phenomenal and Psychological Concepts of Consciousness”
1/27/2020 Ted Goodson “Entangled Photon Absorption Applications in Biology”
2/3/2020 Gustav Bernroider “Cause and Effect in Biology, Causality in Physics and the Problem of Consciousness”
2/10/2020 Jack Tuszynski
“Computational Capabilities and Limitations 
of the Human Brain based on Microtubule 
Involvement at a Sub Neuronal Level”
2/17/2020 Asim Islam “Many-body Quantum Field Models for Nonlinear Brain Dynamics”
2/24/2020 Stuart Kauffman “Mind and Quantum Actualization”
3/2/2020 Brian Josephson “The Subtleties of Coordination”
Statements of Speaker Interests
Marcus Appleby
In physics it is well-known that finding the right question is often at least 
50% of the difficulty. In my contribution I did not propose a solution to 
the problem of consciousness, not even a tentative one. Rather I examined 
the question. This is in the belief that the question is currently mis-posed. 
The current conception of consciousness may be regarded as an attenuated 
version of the Cartesian concept of mind. I argued that the Cartesian 
philosophy was originally motivated by conceptual problems with Galilean 
physics. Quantum mechanics changes things. This is not to say that the 
problem of consciousness is a pseudo-problem, as is sometimes suggested. 
It is, however, to say that the problem is not quite as is often assumed. In 
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particular, it is argued that current conceptions encourage an unbalanced 
conception of mentality, according to which the state of being barely awake 
is the essence of what it is to be human, whereas the thought processes 
which led Einstein to the general theory of relativity are something a 
zombie could manage.
Kenneth Augustyn
What we call the mind began as a non-conscious robotic biochemical 
process control system in the very earliest forms of life.  As life evolved, 
problems in control became more difficult and exceeded the computational 
capabilities of the organisms.  Nature discovered a means of transcending 
computable physical processes giving rise to non-physical mental 
capabilities that, while still not conscious, were no longer entirely physical. 
Biological mentality began to have a degree of genuine autonomy from 
the physical world, affecting the course of (but not the mechanism of) 
evolution.  The integrated amalgam of robotic and transrobotic unconscious 
capabilities eventually gave rise to consciousness, which became an even 
more important factor in the course of evolution.  
The processes responsible for transrobotic mentality are conjectured 
to leave evidence in the physical world in the form of violations of 
conservation laws, evidence that future experiments may be able to detect.
Gustav Bernroider
Bright and Dark Physics:
A Dual Aspect Physicalistic Interpretation of Biological Mentality
Sentience is part of every living organism. It is at the root of life and at 
the root of an object knowing, conscious subject. It seems that if ‘sentience’, 
as the ability to ‘feel something’, is stripped of its cognitive part, taking 
375Special Issue on the Third Workshop on Biological Mentality
away the (physical) organisation behind it, something very fundamental 
still remains. We can probably agree to name this something the ‘qualia’ of 
sentience. I suggest that the phenomenon of life is identical to the ‘qualia’ 
of sentience, i.e. that these two concepts are not just simply related to each 
other, but are actually the same. Now the question arises how does physics 
relate to this?
I think it makes sense to interpret physics as a descriptor for the 
properties of nature that a sentient agent can capture. However, the 
properties themselves seem to come up in two strictly opposing versions, 
a duality originating from the same source, reminiscent to the traditional 
mind-matter duality or subject/object dichotomy. Along this view a 
Russelian interpretation, perhaps a version as suggested more recently by 
Jiri Benowski within a ‘Dual Aspect Monism’ [1] is close to the present 
conjecture. The difference to Benowskis proposal as I am arguing here is, 
that the dualities building on one monistic (‘Agency’) source are not seen 
in the tradition of Mind-Body dualism, but instead can both be situated 
within an extended version of physics, a new kind of physics, compatible 
with the properties of ‘closure’ but indicating a lack of completeness behind 
its canonical version. I call the two opposing concepts in physics ‘bright’ 
and ‘dark’. The terms are purposely suggestive for the increasing demands 
expressed by ‘bright physics’ to resolve open questions by referring to 
some physical ‘dark side’ (as ‘dark matter’ or ‘dark energy’). This applies 
particularly to physical situations instantiated at the far ends of scales, i.e. to 
the low scale quantum level and to the large scale astrophysical level [2,3].
Here I focus on the nature of a relation between the suggested opposing 
sides of physics as they emerge from one source of ‘agency’ or ‘qualia’ in 
the above sense. Using tools from algebraic geometry, I am arguing that the 
most radical relation between these dual aspects in physics is provided by a 
sense relation or mirror symmetry. I provide examples from basic symmetry 
relations and conservation laws in physics and eventually demonstrate 
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unique sense-based organizations in biology, e.g. homo-chirality, 
developmental neuro-psychology and biological chemistries. Furthermore, 
it seems that these concepts extend into the cognitive-mathematical domain 
where mirror symmetries precipitate into a basic distinction between what 
is called ‘symplectic geometry’ on one side and complex geometry on 
the other. These latter observations lead us into a question at the root of 
idealism, about the source of cognitive concepts. In the line of this enduring 
conundrum it is difficult to suggest a plausible route, but I do find many 
similarities between the formal structure of cognitive concepts and the 
structure of geometrical dynamics in our own brain organization. These 
similarities lead me to assume that the way we think is tightly bound to the 
way we are organized [5].
Taken together, the present concept shares many aspects with Augustyn’s 
view on biological mentality [4], except one point. I do not consider the 
most primitive forms of life, as for example apparent in prokaryotic 
cells, as purely ‘robotic’. All life forms within the present view are ‘trans-
robotic’ in Augustyn’s sense, carrying the seeds of sentience, with or 
without consciousness. However, the building up principle underlying 
‘biological mentality’ as suggested in [4] shares many aspects with the view 
I am proposing here. Perhaps, following and modifying Maturana’s and 
Varela’s enactivistic principle [6], a sense relation between a subject and its 
environment could serve as the organizational principle leading to a higher 
cognitive (conscious) status of biological sentience. 
[1]  Benowski J 2016, Dual-aspect monism, Philosophical investigations, 
 39:4,335-352
[2] Perlmutter et al, Astrophysical J. 517, 565-568 (1999)
[3]  Robert H. Sanders: The Dark Matter Problem. A Historical 
 Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
[4]  Augustyn, K.A. Physical Foundations of Biological Mentality, Journal 
 of Cognitive Science (2019) 20(2): 195-214.
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[5] Bernroider, G. 2017 J Integrative Neurosci 16, 105-113.
[6]  Varela, F. (1984) In Ulrich, H., and Probst, G. (eds.), Self Organization 
 and the Management of Social Systems, Springer, Frankfurt.
Alin Christoph Cucu
Quantum mechanics (QM) has long been thought to be able to contribute 
to the question how consciousness (construed non-physically) can be 
causally efficacious in the physical world (interactive dualism). One idea 
is that if non-physical mind interacts on the level of quantum processes, it 
can bring about macroscopic changes without violating the principles of 
momentum and energy conservation. However, energy and momentum 
non-conservation is something physics can deal with (Cucu & Pitts 2019). 
There is thus no impending clash with any law of nature that QM could 
help avoid. But even if there were such a tension, QM would be no remedy, 
since any collapse interpretation of QM entails momentum and energy non-
conservation.
Of course, in light of this one might hold that the mind does work 
through quantum processes although this entails momentum/energy non-
conservation, the latter being unproblematic. As support, one might cite 
the ‘consciousness collapse’ (CC) interpretation of QM, which claims 
to explain our definite perceptions where quantum formalism predicts 
superpositions. However, it turns out to be tricky to spell out exactly the 
relation between states of the non-physical mind and brain states. Also, it 
might be that CC is already empirically refuted (Yu & Nikolic 2011). The 
position of CC is all the more weakened with the existence of at least one 
QM interpretation which explains our observations without recourse to 
extravagant metaphysics, namely Bohmian mechanics (BM). But BM does 
not especially support interactive dualism (nor does it disadvantage it). This 
does not mean, however, that interactive dualists can employ it cheerfully, 
since any mental interaction entails a change in particle trajectory, 
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probability distribution or other initial conditions of quantum processes.
It seems, therefore, that the real question interactive dualists must address 
lies at a deeper level: namely the laws of nature. What is needed is a notion 
of laws of nature that both does justice to the regularity in nature and the 
apparent fact of pervasive mental interaction.
Art Hobson
I am working on various aspects of the quantum measurement problem, 
within the context of standard quantum physics without various corrections 
such as spontaneous collapse, and without specialized interpretations of 
quantum physics such as the many worlds interpretation.  My on-line talk 
for the Center for the Physics of Living Organisms, titled “Entanglement 
and the measurement problem," focused on the problem of definite 
outcomes, also known as the Schroedinger’s cat problem.  Here is the 
abstract:  An argument first proposed by John von Neumann shows that 
measurement of a superposed quantum system creates an entangled 
"measurement state" (MS) in which macroscopically distinct detector 
states appear to be superposed, a paradoxical prediction implying the 
measurement has no definite outcome.  We argue that this prediction is 
based on a misunderstanding of what the MS represents. We show, by 
studying the phase dependence of entangled photon states generated in 
parametric down conversion, that the MS represents not a superposition of 
detector states, but rather a superposition of coherent (i.e. phase-dependent) 
correlations between detector states and system states.  In fact an argument 
by Einstein shows that a nonlocal entangled state is required, at least briefly, 
following a quantum system's interaction with a detector.  Such a state does 
not represent a paradoxical macroscopic superposition.  This resolves the 
paradox of indefinite outcomes of measurements.  
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Asim Islam
The approach to employing quantum field theory for memory and 
brain function was first pioneered by Umezawa and Ricciardi in 1967 by 
comparing brain electrical activity with properties of condensed matter. 
More formally, by examining the macroscopic properties of Bose gases 
which arise from microscopic quantum phenomena it can be shown that 
by extending the concept to many-body systems applied to thermofield 
dynamics and condensed states it is a natural requirement to employ a 
dual state. The notion of duality has been extended to a dissipative model 
by Celeghini, Rasetti and Vitiello and has been further developed to an 
extensive model for brain dynamics by Vitiello, Freeman, Jibu, Yasue and 
others. Neuroscientific studies, based on this model, on humans and animals 
by Freeman and Vitiello have provided new insights into the nature of 
perception and cognition which for the first time relate electrical patterns 
directly to thoughts and perception in a formal scientific manner amenable 
to quantitative analysis.
The model is presently the most accurate predictor of the empirical 
outcomes of a wide range of brain electrical activity and is of growing 
interest amongst quantum physicists and neuroscientists. From a broader 
perspective, it may also provide a deeper insight into the elusive nature 
of human consciousness and proposals have been conjectured by Vitiello, 
Freeman, Jibu and Yasue. Importantly there does not exist any suitable 
alternative neural network based model which can adequately explain the 
empirical data. We review the key elements of the many-body quantum 
brain model with an emphasis on providing a sound physical basis for the 
approach and providing compelling rationale for pursuing the model.
Brian Josephson
I argued a long time ago (Found. Phys. 18, 1195-204 (1988), at 
arXiv:1110.1768) that quantum mechanics has a restricted scope, the way 
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the state of a system is specified being adequate only in a limited class 
of situations, which include those addressed in the kind of experiments 
carried out by physicists, but not those concerning the biological and 
cognitive sciences.  Developments in the latter areas of investigation such 
as biosemiotics and coordination dynamics offer the possibility of an 
alternative fundamental basis for science.  It is not completely inappropriate 
to suggest that approaches by physicists involving the attempt to discover 
a ’theory of everything’ based on a set of equations have passed their ‘best 
before’ date.  My talk, The Subtleties of Coordination, can be viewed at this 
link: https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/3179345.
Andrew Knight
The assumption of algorithmic consciousness implies the ability of 
conscious states to be copied, leading to a variety of seeming paradoxes, 
including the problems of duplication/teleportation, simulation, self-location, 
and the Boltzmann Brain, among others.  Despite notable exceptions, few 
physicists or computer scientists question the assumption that consciousness 
can be copied or simulated by a computer.  In an effort to further elucidate 
the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by 
analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical 
copies of a conscious state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions 
due to quantum fluctuations.  By assuming the supervenience of a conscious 
state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence 
of two or more spacelike instances of the same conscious state leads to a 
logical contradiction if their respective evolutions depend on independent 
quantum events; moreover, if evolutions of those instances do not depend 
on independent quantum events, then quantum no-cloning prevents the 
existence of more than one copy.  I further show that the existence of two or 
more timelike instances of the same conscious state leads to a comparable 
logical contradiction, leading ultimately to a refutation of the assumption 
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that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated 
by any physical means.  This conclusion further refutes the notions of mind 
uploading or simulation, algorithmic or machine consciousness, and Strong 
Artificial Intelligence.
John Myers/Hadi Madjid
As James Peebles put it in his 2019 Nobel Lecture: in the natural sciences 
“[W]e operate on the postulate that nature operates by rules that we can 
discover; that's only a postulate---we have no guarantee that that's how 
nature works---but very productive.” Rules, once discovered, permit 
predictions.
But life in and outside of science is hardly predictable; we all experience 
surprises. Automotive engineers try to sort out the predictable from the 
unpredictable; they do not try to predict the route that an automobile will 
follow over its lifetime; rather, they design it with a steering wheel while 
also making use of discovered regularities in the strength of steel and the 
reaction times of people.
Following a proof of the essential non-uniqueness of explanations 
described in [J. Cog. Sci. 20-2:229-249, 2019], we depart from custom by 
assigning unpredictability a central place in physics, thereby giving more 
emphasis to unpredictable agents, including people and other creatures. As 
an area of application we point out that: agents experiencing unpredictable 
events need to communicate with one another. They do so as agents by 
transmitting unpredictable symbols from one to another. We begin to 
explore mechanisms of symbol handling available to unpredictable agents, 
and in particular the mutual regulation of rhythms of symbol handling 
essential to communication of symbols.  A recent finding is that rhythms 
of unpredictable symbols are essential to any application of the concept 
of spacetime [Meas. Sci. Technol. 31 025106 (2020)]. For the future we 
wonder: what role do rhythms of symbols play in animal navigation?
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J. Brian Pitts
Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized 
for violating the conservation of  energy and momentum. (Non-
epiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses 
clearly fail.  But conservation laws have important neglected features 
generally undermining the objection.  Conservation is local, holding first not 
for the universe, but for everywhere separately.  The energy (or momentum) 
in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no 
teleportation).  Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of 
local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality.  Energy 
(momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the 
laws over time (space).  Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail 
due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while 
holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars.  
Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply 
symmetries.  Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure 
of the physical.  But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without 
looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism.  Hence Leibniz's 
objection begs the question.  Empirical  neuroscience is another matter.  So 
is Einstein's General Relativity, to be discussed later.
In discussions about whether the conservation of energy and momentum 
undermine Cartesian mental causation, General Relativity (GR) has 
rarely been considered.  But a few authors have proposed that the non-
localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically 
meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to 
mental causation:  conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for 
minds to violate.
This paper is motivated by two ideas.  First, one might take seriously 
the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the laws 
and hence, by Noether's first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-
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momenta (thus answering Schroedinger's 1918 false-negative objection). 
Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the 
Dirac-Maxwell-Einstein equations to describe mental causation.  This paper 
uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends 
to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation.  In the simplest 
case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and 
hence 0.  The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its 
persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations.
Robert Prentner
“Biological mentality” opens up a new possibility to conceive of the way 
that consciousness is related to the physical world. By replacing the dualism 
mind/brain with a three-stage model of the mind (robotics - “transrobotic” 
mentality - consciousness), a new option arises: Perhaps, the phenomenon 
of mammalian consciousness could be explained as “complexification” of a 
semi-autonomous hierarchy of mental processes (or in fact “mental agents”, 
since transrobotic mentality is assumed to endow such processes with literal 
desires and intentions)? 
This raises some questions – both analytic and synthetic. First, to 
what extent is the designation “mentality” justified (over and above the 
properties we could associate with computational processes), and how 
far does the metaphor go? For example, does it make sense to ask about 
“phenomenality”, i.e. whether “it-is-something-like” for an organism 
to have transrobotic mentality? And if so, what does this tell us about 
consciousness? Second, how should one understand that biological 
mentality complexifies and results in conscious phenomena? Could we 
construct a formal model of this process which is (i) compatible with the (e.g. 
evolutionary) principles which informed the framework in the first place, 
and which (ii) makes concrete empirical predictions?
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Jack Tuszynski
One aspect of the amazing functioning abilities of the human brain that is 
seldom discussed is its energetic efficiency. Here, we use simple reasoning 
based on time, length and energy scales to analyze the possible information 
processing rates of the human brain based on the metabolic energy cost of 
encoding a bit of information. We use well-known empirical information 
about the brain and its constituent neurons and sub-neuronal structures to 
arrive at characteristic information processing rates at all relevant scales. In 
order to maintain consistent metabolic rates and clocking frequencies for 
updating information content, we conclude that only coherently quantum-
entangled tubulin dimers in the neuron are likely to operate at a quantum 
level if their functions include information storage and processing. On the 
other hand, ion channels, even if unsynchronized may be able to operate 
in a quantum mechanical regime. It is also relevant in this context to 
invoke the concept of quantum metabolism as a consistent framework for 
living systems as opposed to the highly touted quantum biology, which so 
far has been lacking coherence and synchronization, properties of life in 
general. Without metabolism, there is no life and without life there is no 
consciousness. For this reason I believe the story of consciousness should 
start with the concept of energy transduction.
